SPAG021 · NEBRASKA · CATTLE SIMSPAG021 · NEBRASKA · CATTLE SIMNebraska's cattle business runs through two different markets, and the model now prices them separately. Fed cattle ($17.9B, about 88% of USDA's $20.34B cash receipts) sell feedlot-to-packer with no commission: SPAG021's value there is fairer price discovery, at a light 5 bps take. Feeder cattle coming into Nebraska feedlots ($7.9B through commission venues, which USDA receipts do not count) pay 2–4% to sell today: SPAG021 replaces that at 35 bps. Together: $36.6M of annual platform revenue at full statewide penetration, $57.4M at the post-proof rates. The funded 25,000-head, ~$65.9M GMV feeder pilot is the proof point, not the size of the opportunity.
The 35 bps cattle take is the proposed disruptive launch rate. A 50 bps post-Year-1 rate remains materially below current published auction/video commissions and is shown as upside, not the launch assumption.
| Feeder / commission channel | Existing low-end channel | SPAG021 launch | Higher rate after proof |
|---|---|---|---|
| Transaction cost per $100K GMV | $1,750 | $350 | $500 |
| Discount to existing low-end fee | Baseline | 80% cheaper | 71% cheaper |
| Annual SPAG021 revenue · Nebraska cattle (both channels) | — | $36.6M | $57.4M |
| Participants retain of modeled value | — | 89.0% | 83.3% |
| SPAG021 share of modeled value | — | 11.0% | 16.7% |
Nebraska's 2025 cattle market is the top-line context. First see the modeled economics of a fully SPAG021-enabled market; then see how little of that market the 25,000-head pilot needs to touch to validate the architecture. Every operating assumption remains adjustable.
This is the full-market economic ceiling under the selected assumptions — not a near-term adoption forecast. It shows the prize the pilot is designed to prove can be captured progressively.
This is the first economic proof investors are funding: a small Nebraska cattle network operating for a full year, with explicit benefits to producers, buyers, liquidity providers, SPAG021 and the market itself.
The pilot is deliberately small: prove mechanism, settlement, participant savings and LP economics before scaling.
USDA NASS 2025 cattle/calf cash receipts and marketings. USDA marketings exclude sales between farms, so receipts are mostly slaughter-weight cattle; the feeder trade into Nebraska feedlots is sized separately from inshipments. Ceiling comparison, not a capture claim.
How much physical cattle volume the SPAG021 network processes.
Fed cattle are priced on price discovery; feeders on commission savings.
Current benchmark versus modeled SPAG021 cost.
Modeled financing and platform economics inside the same physical GMV.
Kept separate from transaction-cost savings so accelerated GMV is not mistaken for profit.
12-month reduction in modeled selling/marketing cost.
12-month reduction in modeled procurement friction.
Modeled net yield on committed LP capital after utilization and reserve.
12-month modeled platform revenue at selected take rate.
The buyer pays roughly double a bank operating-loan rate, but only for the days between auction and settlement or refinancing: about 0.58% of the financed amount on a 14-day draw. The case for it is speed and availability at the moment of the bid, not price. LP yield is net of the selected reserve; actual loss experience is not yet measured. Sources: Purdue Agricultural Credit Outlook 2026; Kansas City Fed Survey of Terms of Lending to Farmers.
Feeder savings apply the selected cost assumptions to the feeder channel only; fed cattle earn the price-discovery gain per cwt. LP financing applies to feeder purchases only (packers already pay by the next business day). Market-scale sensitivity, not an adoption forecast.
Producer + buyer transaction-cost savings is the difference between the selected current transaction-cost assumptions and the selected SPAG021 cost assumptions across modeled network GMV. LP financed volume is turnover, not capital committed. Committed capital is derived from financing duration and utilization; net LP yield deducts the selected annual reserve. Accelerated failed-clear transaction value is throughput moved faster, not profit, and is deliberately not added to participant savings.
The investor has already seen the prize and the pilot. This section separates observed market facts from modeled assumptions, then the animations show how SPAG021 produces the economic result.
Three cattle lots at the North Platte Stockyards-hosted sale were explicitly marked NO SALE: 100 head, 150 head and 40 bred cows.
UNL representative cattle budgets use a four-percent marketing charge as a typical commission + sale-related fee assumption.
Western Video Market publicly lists thirteen 2025 sale dates, giving us an independent lot-level archive to expand the PO/no-sale dataset.
Less than 20% of corn and soybean production was under marketing contracts — evidence that physical-market coordination remains fragmented beyond cattle too.
The 290-head North Platte case is hard evidence. The downstream seller, buyer and system costs are not publicly itemized, so the simulator makes those assumptions adjustable instead of disguising them as facts.
The cattle remain unresolved. Seller and buyer must continue sourcing/marketing through another negotiation, another sale or another scheduled market.
The seller and buyer mandates remain alive. Agents can adjust only inside human-defined boundaries and automatically enter the next hourly market.
Watch the same modeled legacy wait accumulate friction while SPAG021 keeps reopening the market every hour.
This does not claim all 290 head would sell on SPAG021, nor that every legacy seller waits seven days. It measures the structural difference: the market can retry without rebuilding the transaction from scratch.
The replay holds price qualification constant and shows how reliable small and midsize participants can build allocation and fill access over repeated auctions. One seller and one buyer remain price-out to prove that loyalty never rescues bad economics.
As qualified participation accumulates, allocation broadens, buyer fill improves and concentration falls — while the price qualification rule never changes.
Everyone begins from the same 50-point Persistence baseline. Economics and reliability dominate because the market has no behavioral memory yet.
Auction 1 baseline.
Auction 1 baseline.
Baseline concentration.
$390.40 ceiling remains below the $390.66 clear. Persistence never rescues the bid.
Watch the same buyer move from 120 → 150 → 180 head of settlement capacity. The clearing price never moves.
Its $392 ceiling clears the economic test, but its own settlement capacity covers only 120 of the 180 head allocated.
A physical market first, with programmable commitments, performance stake, persistent reputation, pooled liquidity and settlement underneath. Dollars on existing bank rails; no token.
Verified physical identity and transaction state, recorded with tamper-evident history.
USD collateral against payment and delivery. Fulfillment improves future terms.
Outside capital expands settlement capacity only after the buyer qualifies economically.
Prefunded escrow at the partner bank and instant payment rails. Same-day final settlement.
Hard evidence: Western Video Market sale results, January 6, 2025, North Platte Stockyards; Western Video Market public 2025 results archive; University of Nebraska–Lincoln Center for Agricultural Profitability cattle budgets; USDA Economic Research Service contracting data.
Western Video Market — Jan. 6, 2025 North Platte results · Western Video Market public sale archive · UNL Central Nebraska cattle budgets · USDA ERS farm contracting
Modeled assumptions: holding cost, re-market friction, buyer sourcing friction, duplicate market-processing cost, re-match rate, persistence growth, liquidity capacity and financing economics. These are deliberately adjustable and are not presented as measured Nebraska averages.